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Blood, Sweat and Grants 
‘Honest Jim’ and the European database-right 
 




Access to detailed, up-to-date and available bioinformatics databases has been 
identified by the Commission of the European Union as a pillar for the harvesting of 
the potential of life-sciences and biotechnology. Unconditional access to research 
data, however, is squarely at odds with the primary interest of every scientist to be the 
first to make a discovery. This classical dilemma is specifically pressing in the data-
driven field of biomedical research, where data-quantity has become a quality on its 
own, where speed matters and patients can’t wait. The dilemma urges a consideration 
of the principle, the practice and the law regarding access for academic researchers to 
unpublished research data. The consideration will include the presentation of the 
outcome of a global and a national survey among biomedical researchers on the 
accessibility of ‘their’ research data. The principled arguments pro unconditional 
access and the laws and practical considerations contra unconditional access offer 
conflicting perspectives and the resulting situation is compounded by the uncertainty 
created by the European database-right as to who holds legal title to the databases. 
Therefore, it is explored whether the two opposing concerns – unconditional access 
vs. legitimate restrictions – can be accommodated by the adoption and 
implementation of a general policy for access to biomedical data that greases the 




In 1953 Watson and Crick won the race to discover the molecular structure of DNA. 
They described the double helix in an article in Nature. The second last sentence of 
the article reads:  
 
We have also been stimulated by a knowledge of the general nature 
of the unpublished experimental results and ideas of Dr. M.H.F. 
Wilkins and Dr. R. E. Franklin and their co-workers at King’s 
College London.1  
 
How appropriate this gesture was, appears from a paragraph in The Double Helix, the 
personal account of the race to discover the DNA-structure, published fifteen years 
later by ‘Honest Jim’ Watson: 
 
Rosy [Franklin], of course, did not directly give us her data. For 
that matter no one at King’s realized they were in our hands.2   
 
Watson and Crick had come upon Franklin’s data via Max Perutz, the leader of their 
unit, to whom the data had been reported as a member on a committee appointed by 
the Medical Research Council to look into the research activities of Wilkins’ lab. 
Confronted with this alleged breach of faith on his part, Perutz later replied that the 
incident inaccurately pictured Wilkins and Franklin as jealously trying to keep their 
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data secret and Watson and Crick as getting hold of crucial data in an underhand way. 
Perutz pointed out that, first, the remit of the committee on which he had served was 
not to look into the research activities of Wilkins but to establish contact between the 
groups of people working for the MRC; second, that the MRC report was not 
confidential and, third, that the one important piece of information it contained might 
have been known by Crick a year earlier if Watson had taken notes at the seminar 




Watson’s revelations illustrate the dilemma of every scientist: the race to be the first 
versus the need to stand on the shoulders of colleagues and competitors. Fifty years 
after the description of the double helix, this dilemma is more urgent than ever before, 
especially in the area of biomedical research. The principle is simple: both verification 
of scientific findings and the public nature of its funding demand unconditional access 
to research data. In real life, things ain’t that simple. After Internet and the ICT-
revolution, GRIDS are increasingly providing a new research tool. GRIDS make 
possible a whole new type of experiments and enable researchers to work jointly and 
simultaneously on the same datasets. As a result, biomedical research is more ‘data-
driven’ than ever before and ‘unique datasets’ have become a researcher’s ‘life-line’. 
Which data can he claim as his own? Is he under an obligation to give access to his 
unpublished data? Why? Which data? To anybody? For what purpose? With or 
without conditions attached? 
 
Over these complex questions hangs, as from March 11, 1996, as a deus ex machina, 
the sword of the European database-right.4 This novel, sui generis right aims to 
protect the blood, sweat and tears that go into producing a database, against 
unauthorised use by third parties. To that end, it provides for an exclusive right to use 
and and re-utilize databases that demonstrate a substantial investment. Prima facie 
this right is at odds with the scientific imperative of the free flow of information. 
However, depending on who actually owns the right, it is a double-edged sword that 
could cut either way. In the hands of a public funding body, it is an instrument to 
secure academic scientists access to the research data produced by their colleagues. In 
the hands of a scientist it may be used as a weapon to legitimise and enforce data-
exclusivity. 
 
A recent and urgent case study to analyse the above issues is presented by the 
Netherlands National Genomics Strategy.5 This strategy is built on the premise that 
the Netherlands have a number of unique biomedical databases and population 
cohorts, which may yield a competitive edge globally. Part of this strategy is to open 
up these databases for further, large-scale research into the ‘nature and nurture’ of 
common complex diseases. For this strategy to succeed, however, the scientists that 
build these collections must be willing to give access to their data, and, if not, such 
access should be legally enforceable. As we will see, this discussion is inextricably 
interwoven with and has implications for similar issues at the European level, where 
similar initiatives exist such as COGENE and the GenomEUtwin project. In fact, the 
European Commission has identified ‘access to detailed, up-to-date and available 
bioinformatics databases and open access to knowledge’ as two of the three pillars for 
the harvesting of the potential of life-sciences and biotechnology.6
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This Article discusses the ‘essential tension’ between the need for academic 
researchers to have unconditional access to unpublished research data and the 
exclusive database-right. The sharing ethos in academia is paradigm, as is the 
assertion that the European database-right constitutes a violation of that ethos. 
However, for these issues too, ‘context is King’. To do justice to this context, I took 
the following approach. Part I sets forth the Principle underlying access to data: 
Communism. Revisiting the Four Commandments for scientific behaviour postulated 
by Robert K. Merton, this Article will argue that there is a need to formulate a Fifth 
Commandment: unconditional access to unpublished research data. Part II will 
examine the current Practice governing access to research data in biomedical 
academia: Capitalism. It will first present and discuss the outcome of two surveys into 
the actual willingness of biomedical researchers to grant access to ‘their’ research 
data. One survey was held among human geneticists worldwide; the second survey 
was held among all principal investigators in the area of specific biomedical research 
in the Netherlands. Second, Part II will review a variety of reasons why, in practice, 
access may be denied or subjected to specific conditions. We will see that the 
principled arguments pro unconditional access (Part I) and the laws and practical 
considerations contra (unconditional) access (Part II) offer divergent if not downright 
conflicting perspectives. Therefore, Part III will analyse whether this Gordian knot 
can be cut by operation of the Law, i.e. by analysing who owns scientific research 
data. As the European database-right seems the most obvious avenue for this legal 
analysis, we will apply the European database-right to a concrete biomedical database, 
which has both a Dutch and a European dimension: the Netherlands Twin Registry 
that forms part of the GenomEU-Twin project. Finally, Part IV will discuss Policy: 
how can the principle, the practice and the law pertaining to access to unpublished 
research data be converted into an effective data-access policy designed to grease the 
wheels of publicly funded biomedical research.  
 
I.  In principle: Communism 
 
I.1  Merton’s Four Commandments  
 
The goal of science. The scientific mores have been formulated by science sociologist 
Robert K. Merton.7 Merton first determines the institutional goal of science as the 
‘extension of certified knowledge.’8 The technical method employed toward this end 
is empirical research. The scientific mores both derive from and serve the goal and 
method of science: universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organised 
skepticism.9  
 
Universalism. This imperative aims to guarantee that ‘truth-claims are to be subjected 
to pre-established impersonal criteria’. What works in a Tokyo laboratory must also 
work in a laboratory in Leiden. Thus, universalism enables scientists from diverse 
backgrounds and personal beliefs to contribute to the universal tree of knowledge.  
 
Communism. ‘Communism’ is meant by Merton as the communal ownership of 
‘intellectual goods’. ‘Secrecy is the anti-thesis of this norm: full and open 
communication its enactment’. The communal nature of science is incompatible with 
exclusive (intellectual) property rights.10 Scientific findings constitute a ‘common 
heritage’ in which ‘the equity of the individual producer is limited’. It follows from 
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the institutional goal and method of science that the scientist’s sole property right in 
‘his’ findings is that of recognition and esteem. This emphasis on recognition forces a 
scientist to be the first to make a scientific discovery. According to Merton this results 
in a system of ‘competitive co-operation’.11 The products of this competition are 
communized, with the original contributor being rewarded only with recognition and 
eternal fame.12 Merton emphasises that this competitive co-operation cannot prejudice 
the status of scientific knowledge as common good. The communist nature of science 
is also illuminated and reinforced by the mos to acknowledge in publications that the 
individual contribution of the author to the tree of knowledge was made possible by 
the contributions of many others.13
 
Disinterestedness and organised skepticism. The imperative of disinterestedness 
means that the pursuit of scientific truth should always prevail over the pursuit of the 
scientists’ personal interests. In particular, scientists should not serve political 
interests.14 The norm of ‘organised skepticism’, means that the scientific community 
should subject any findings of its members to empirical and logical testing before 
accepting them as true.15
 
The reward structure of science. In addition to formulating the Four Commandments 
of science, Merton also elucidated how these norms are reinforced by the reward 
system of science.16 Scientific communism is rewarded by recognition.17 Recognition 
takes many forms: eponymy, - Pythagoras’ axiom, Kepler’s laws, Huntington’s 
disease, Factor V Leiden; prizes and premiums, – the Nobelprize, the Spinoza prize, 
and membership of academies – the Royal Society, the Royal Netherlands Academy 
of Sciences.18 Recognition of course requires publication and here the goal, method 
and reward system interrelate. Publication serves the norms of universalism and 
disinterestedness and enables independent replication and thus verification of truth 
claims. Publication of original findings also serves the institutional goal of science: 
the extension of certified knowledge.  
 
I.2  The Fifth Commandment: unconditional access to research data 
 
Merton’s communism demands and implies that researchers have access to each 
other’s publications. The question, however, is whether access to published findings is 
sufficient. ‘Honest Jim’s account of the race to discover the structure of DNA 
illustrates the importance of access to the ‘unpublished experimental results and 
ideas’. Following is an inventory of arguments to formulate a Fifth Commandment: 
unconditional access to unpublished research data. 
 
I.2.1 Unconditional access is necessary for scientific revolutions. The primary goal of 
unconditional access is to enable verification of scientific findings by others. Thus, 
this imperative helps create a barrier against ‘fraud, theft and self-deception’.19 
However, verification also serves a more remote goal. While Merton and later on 
Popper assume that scientists are continuously engaged in improving respectively 
falsifying each other’s findings, Kuhn has pointed at the confirmatory behaviour of 
scientists.20 Scientists are inclined to mainly confirm and refine established theories 
or ‘paradigms’.21 Kuhn has named that process ‘normal science’. He compares 
‘normal science’ to solving puzzles, in that both are not aimed at producing major 
novelties, neither conceptual nor phenomenal.22 The solution of a puzzle is 
anticipated and not intrinsically interesting or important; the challenge is to find a new 
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way to achieve that solution.23 Inadvertently, Watson aptly illustrates this point in his 
description of Sir Lawrence Bragg, then director of the Cavendish laboratory where 
Watson and Crick did their work on DNA: 
 
For almost forty years Bragg, a Nobel Prize winner and one of the 
founders of christallography, had been watching X-ray diffraction 
methods solve structures of ever-increasing difficulty. The more 
complex the molecule, the happier Bragg became when a new 
method allowed its elucidation.24
 
In contrast, Kuhn points out that the ‘really pressing problems, e.g. a cure for cancer 
(..) are often not puzzles at all, largely because they have no solution.’25 Kuhn 
emphasises, however, that paradigms are necessary for the conduct of ‘normal 
science’. Paradigms indicate which data to select, which experiments should be done 
and which refinements are necessary to perfect a theory.26 However, if scientists 
spend more time to adjust facts to theory rather than the other way around,27 a crisis 
will emerge in case too many facts no longer fit the paradigm. Such a period of crisis 
may lead to the formulation of new theories, the so-called paradigm shift or ‘scientific 
revolution’.28 In a revolution those who challenge the scientific establishment will 
scrutinize existing paradigms by: 
 
handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them in a 
new system of relations with one another by giving them a different 
framework.29
 
However, the revolution will not take place or be delayed, unless there is 
unconditional access to the data. It is precisely in a period of crisis that such access is 
crucial. If Kuhn is right, his theory provides a powerful argument for unconditional 
access to research data. If scientists are in a position to deny access to their research 
data, they will be inclined to grant access exclusively to scientists who adhere to the 
same paradigms. 30 This inclination may be reinforced by the existence of symbiotic, 
informal networks of like-minded scientists.31  
 
I.2.2 Unconditional access is necessary for the ‘Invisible Hand of Research’. Related 
to the paradigm issue, is the importance of individualism and independence in 
science.32 Traditional academic freedom entails that scientists are free to choose their 
research objectives and method. This freedom will be curtailed if science is centrally 
co-ordinated, whether by non-scientists or by scientific peers. Co-ordination seems a 
logical and necessary instrument to avoid duplication of efforts and a waste of 
resources. However, co-ordination can be fatal to individual initiatives. In The 
Republic of Science, Michael Polyani has argued that independent initiatives, 
undertaken by competing scientists, are the most efficient way to organise scientific 
research.33 As long as a scientist keeps an eye on the work of the others, he will take 
their efforts into account when formulating his own research questions.34 Polyani has 
labelled this system a system of self ‘co-ordination by way of mutual adjustments of 
independent initiatives.35 This co-ordination should not be centralised, but rather be 
guided by an ‘invisible hand’. Just as the ‘invisible hand’ in a free market-economy 
helps producers and consumers make supply meet demand and thus achieve 
maximum welfare, the ‘invisible hand of research’ will guide scientists to achieve 
maximum progress of science.36
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The Jigsaw puzzle. Polyani illustrates his point using the metaphor of the ‘Jigsaw 
puzzle’, a fitting metaphor in view of Kuhn’s description of ‘normal science’ as 
puzzle-solving. Solving a Jigsaw-puzzle requires, just as solving complex scientific 
problems, the contributions of multiple persons.37 Each person will, watched by the 
others, focus on a particular section of the puzzle and make use of the insights which 
develop successively as other sections are being solved. The effectiveness of the 
group will exceed that of its isolated members ‘to the extent to which some member 
of the group will always discover a new chance for adding a piece to the puzzle more 
quickly than any one isolated person could have done by himself.’38 Now imagine, 
Polanyi argues, that the activities of the group are co-ordinated by a single authority. 
That would reduce the joint effectiveness of the group as a whole to the effectiveness 
and insights of this co-ordinator. In the alternative model, the ‘Invisible Hand’ will 
prevent this from happening.  
 
Polanyi’s model however, requires that each scientist knows what the other puzzle-
solvers are doing. For the ‘Invisible Hand’ to succeed, every helper also needs access 
to all pieces of the puzzle. According to Polanyi, mutual adjustment of independent 
initiatives will take place by scientists’ taking note of the published results of other 
scientists. Publications thus play the role in science, which the prices of goods and 
services play in the economy, as a means to ‘make supply meet demand’.39 However, 
Polanyi fails to complete his analogy with Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’. He fails to 
mention that the ‘Invisible Hand’ cannot operate, if the market forces do not have 
complete information or if one party has a monopoly.40 A similar market-failure is 
likely to paralyse the operation of the ‘Invisible Hand’ of research, if a scientist has no 
knowledge of, or no access to, unpublished research data. In other words, if Polanyi is 
right, his model of the ‘Invisible Hand’ is also a powerful argument for unconditional 
access to research data.  
 
I.2.3 Unconditional access is necessary to enable new research. This argument has a 
financial and a scientific component. First of all, unconditional access will save costs. 
Absent exclusive rights on data, other researchers need not negotiate terms of access 
and save both transaction costs and real costs, such as royalties and other forms of 
compensation. Thus, the original data-producers subsidize ‘second comers’.41 Though 
this may look like a ‘free ride’ for the second comer on the blood, sweat and tears of 
the original researcher, the system has an element of ‘distributive justice’. Most likely, 
the original researcher has had the benefits of the efforts put in by his predecessors. 
And the system works two ways, of course. The potential ‘free ride’ may be offset by 
reciprocal access or access to data elsewhere. The scientific component of this 
argument cannot be better formulated than by Newton’s aphorism: If I have seen 
farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. 
 
I.2.4 Unconditional access is required because of public funding. Another argument is 
the fact that the research has been paid for out of public means. In this view, the 
government should not fund the same research twice, since that would be a waste of 
taxpayer’s money. On closer investigation, however, this position may be too simple. 
As Merton made clear, duplication of effort does not always amount to a waste of 
resources.42 First, the replication of research, for purposes of validating or falsifying 
truth claims, is an essential element of the scientific method. Second, as Polanyi made 
clear, chances are that a particular problem is solved more quickly if worked upon by 
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multiple researchers. Third, if multiple researchers reach the same conclusions, the 
results are more likely to be accepted. Fourth, multiple researchers may have diverse 
approaches, give diverse interpretations and see diverse implications for subsequent 
research. A fifth, more prosaic consideration is that the data are not always fit for use 
by others. To that end, they must be made accessible and stored, which may require 
an extra investment. This extra investment is typically not funded by the funding 
bodies, since they typically only fund the original research. In this view, a researcher 
may legitimately reject a request for access to ‘his’ data on the ground that such 
access requires an investment which has not been publicly funded.  
 
I.2.5 Unconditional access is necessary because research is ‘data-driven’. Since 
Merton formulated his Four Commandments, a number of developments have 
heightened the need of access to data.43 Most recently, after Internet and the ICT-
revolution, scientists increasingly make use of GRIDS. GRIDS are operating systems 
for virtual networks of computers which enable the bundling of hardware and 
information – such as computational power, data-storage and measurements 
devices.44 GRIDS enable a quintessentially novel type of experiments and enable 
scientists to work on the same data simultaneously. The ‘permanent data-revolution’ 
has created ‘oceans of data’ in biomedical research, such as the sequence of the 
human genome, a database of three billion base-pairs.45 The sequence illustrates how 
the boundaries between ‘data’ and research results have become blurred. The 
sequence is both milestone and a starting point for further research.46  
 
One of the consequences of the data-explosion is that contemporary biomedical 
research has become data-driven rather than hypothesis-driven. One of the challenges 
in the post-genomic era, for example is the research into the “nature and nurture” of 
common complex disorders.47 This research involves the correlation of millions of 
data-points by correlating molecular measurements of thousands of genes, proteins 
and metabolites with all sorts of clinical data (such as blood pressure, cholesterol, 
diabetes and MRI-scans). Subsequently or sometimes initially, these data are 
aggregated with data from databases resulting from comparable research data stored 
in other databases.48 Any identified patterns and correlations can be used to formulate 
new hypotheses. This type of research may be aided by the creation of bio-banks, 
large-scale collections of “nature and nurture” information in the form of human 
biological material and associated health information. Such a bio-bank can be 
constructed by linking pre-existing molecular and clinical databases.49 As we saw in 
the Introduction, the opening up of existing collections is part of the Netherlands 
National Genomics Strategy and one of the pillars of the EU for the harvesting of the 
potential of life-sciences and biotechnology. Obviously, this type of research and this 
strategy is to a large extent dependent on unconditional access to appropriate datasets. 
 
I.2.6 Unconditional access is necessary as science is used for policy-making: policy-
embedded research. In Science and the Social Order, Merton mentions a dinner for 
scientists in Cambridge. The scientists are said to toast: 
 
[t]o pure mathematics and may it never be of use to anyone!  
 
Science however, has come to be used as both an impetus and a justification for most, 
if not all kinds of far-reaching policy-making. As to public health policy, virtually all 
decision-making and priority setting nowadays must be ‘evidence-based’, meaning 
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based on scientific evidence. For example, as part of its 6th Framework Programme 
for research and development, the EU has established a special programme to enhance 
research for policy support in the area of public health, with an indicative budget of 
EUR 590 million. As ‘policy-enhancing’ instruments, scientific ‘truth-claims’ have 
assumed an impact that goes far beyond the traditional goal of extending certified 
knowledge for its own sake. This impact provides an extra argument for the 
replication of the scientific evidence that is used to justify a specific policy. The 
recent controversy over climate change and global warming illustrates this point. The 
Kyoto protocol aimed to address the environmental concerns has been ratified, 
without any replication of the original research findings underlying its policies. It was 
not until a couple of researchers undertook to replicate this research, that it became 
clear that it might be seriously flawed50. Obviously, replication of ‘policy supporting’ 
science requires unconditional access to research data.  
 
I.2.7 Unconditional access is necessary because speed matters and patients can’t 
wait. A final argument does, strictly speaking, not derive from the institutional goal or 
method of science, but is no less principled. It concerns the actual object of 
biomedical research: the patient. Ultimately, it is his problem science is trying to 
solve. Scientists however, are inclined to appropriate problems. Watson and Crick’s 
decision to devote themselves to the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, 
was against the academic etiquette. DNA was Wilkins’ problem, not to be touched by 
others. As Watson put it:  
 
At this time molecular work on DNA in England was, for all 
practical purposes, the personal property (sic) of Maurice Wilkins, a 
bachelor who worked in London at King’s College’. It would have 
looked very bad if Francis (Crick) had jumped in on a problem that 
Maurice had worked over for several years.’51
 
Wilkins, in turn, was having difficulties with Rosalind Franklin, his assistant, who 
claimed DNA as her problem.52 Such an appropriation of problems is undesirable in 
biomedical research, at least to the extent the interests of patients are at stake. Unlike, 
let’s say, the fruit fly, the object of this type of research, the patient, has a stake in the 
outcome. Even more so, the outcome may not only be vital for himself, but also for 
his family, his progeny, an entire population and, where globally spread diseases such 
as AIDS and SARS are concerned, the global community. Should researchers 
nevertheless refrain from ‘jumping in’ on their colleagues’ problems, patients and 
their relatives will stand up to enforce unconditional access and sharing. For them 
‘speed matters’; they cannot and will not wait until the researcher who claims their 
problem as his problem, has actually solved the problem. Recent examples are patient 
initiatives in the United Sates to bundle forces, collect material and data of their peers 
worldwide and make these available for the research community.53 A group of parents 
of autistic children, for example, has, frustrated by the unwillingness of the 
researchers to share their data, created their own database, the Autism Genetic 
Resource Exchange. This database is accessible for every researcher and has so far 
yielded some 18 publications.54 As a related, additional benefit, unconditional access 
obviates the need for a researcher to re-contact a patient or volunteer and subject him 
to repeat investigations. 
 
Conclusion Part I. In addition to Merton’s Four Commandments, scientific 
revolutions, the ‘Invisible Hand of Research’, public funding, the data-driven nature 
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of research and the interests of patients and the public at large, jointly and separately 
provide powerful arguments to postulate a Fifth Commandment: unconditional access 
to unpublished research data. The next part will examine the current Practice 
governing access to research data in biomedical academia. 
  
II  In practice: Capitalism 
 
II. 1  ‘Honest Jim’ 
 
As was to be expected, neither Merton’s communist ideal nor the ideal of 
unconditional access are standard practice in the real life of science. In The Double 
Helix Watson reveals a number of incidents of ‘capitalist’ behaviour.55 The quote in 
the Introduction already revealed that Watson and Crick had been ‘stimulated by a 
general knowledge of the unpublished experiments and results’ of Wilkins and 
Franklin, unbeknownst to the latter. Also, Wilkins, who was to share the Nobelprize 
with Watson and Crick, was said to have rejected a request by his competitor Linus 
Pauling for a copy of Wilkins’ X-ray photos of DNA. Watson asserts that Wilkins 
wanted to study the data in more detail before releasing them.56 And when Watson 
and Crick find out that Pauling made a mistake in his published description of the 
structure of DNA, they go to the pub to toast to the ‘Pauling failure’.57  
 
Watson’s revelations struck the scientific community like a bombshell.58 That was, 
however, not because of the departures from Merton’s Four Commandments, but 
because Watson had violated the community’s omerta. Violations of the sharing ethos 
were known to occur, but, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. 
Since the publication of The Double Helix, however, a number of commentators have 
pointed at the fact that Merton’s science ethos is not always adhered to.59 In his 
review of The Double Helix, Merton asserted that, historically, Watson’s competitive 
behaviour was not unique and a necessary corollary of the institutional emphasis on 
scientific priority.60 Merton could not resist noting the intense and successful co-
operation of Watson and Crick with other scientists. Thus, he managed to squeeze 
Honest Jim’s behaviour within the ‘competitive cooperation’, he had described in his 
Four Commandments. 
 
II.2  Data-access in Biomedical Academia 
 
II.2.1 The Bermuda Principles. The evidence presented in The Double Helix is, 
obviously, anecdotal. In contrast, a number of recent large-scale ‘community resource 
projects’ have achieved their objective of pre-publication release of the raw data they 
produced, suggesting adherence by the scientific community to the Five 
Commandments. Namely, the 1996 Bermuda principles, encouraging producers of 
large scale DNA sequencing assemblies to release prior to publication their data 
immediately for free and unrestricted use by the scientific community61, have been 
reinforced by various funding agencies, including the US National Human Genome 
Research Institute (NHGRI). To date, these policies have secured open access to at 
least 54862 public genetic databases worldwide, available on the internet, including 
the large international nucleotide databases (EMBL and GenBank).63 In 2003, the 
attendees of a meeting organized by the Wellcome Trust, reaffirmed the Bermuda 
principles of pre-publication release and recommended their extension to other 
existing and future ‘community resource projects’, such as the SNP-consortium and 
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the International HapMap Project64. However, the meeting also considered that 
beyond those large-scale ‘community resource projects’, many valuable small-scale 
data sets could come from other sources. Since those resources emerge from research 
efforts whose primary goal is not resource generation, the meeting considered that the 
contribution of these data to the public domain is more a voluntary matter. That raises 
the question to which extent such contributions are standard practice.65  
 
II.2.2 Global survey. With the assistance of the Human Genome Organisation, the 
American Society of Human Genetics and the European Society of Human Genetics, I 
conducted a global survey among their members in the fourth quarter of 2003. The 
web-survey was completed by a total of 118 human geneticists.66 While this was only 
a fraction of the sample taken and therefore not representative, the responses offer an 
interesting peek in the practice of data-access in academic genetics in a range of 
countries (over 15 different countries) and at a diversity of institutions (universities, 
hospitals and research institutes). A majority of 51% of the respondents responded 
that they did not grant access to their own databases to non-commercial institutions. 
Notably, in view of the predominantly public funding of the databases, only one third 
(35%) of the respondents reported to grant access to their databases to non-
commercial institutions for free. These percentages were only slightly  different for 
those databases that were labelled ‘unique’ or single-source.  
 
II.2.3 United States survey. In the US, Campbell et al. conducted the first national 
survey on data-withholding among American geneticists. Their study yielded, inter 
alia, the following results.67 In a 3 year period, 47% of the respondents had had 
denied at least one request for additional information, data or material concerning 
published results. Most denials concerned requests for biomaterial (35%), sequence 
information (28%), applicable findings (25%), phenotype information (22%) and 
additional information concerning laboratory techniques. Due to these denials, 28% 
was unable to verify published findings.  
 
II.2.4 The Netherlands survey. In a 2004 websurvey, Dutch biomedical researchers 
were asked whether they granted access to ‘their’ data to other scientists. This and 
related questions formed part of a survey I conducted as part of a survey of Dutch 
population-cohorts and patient-databases, conducted by the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Sciences.68 Its specific purpose was ‘to investigate whether the opening 
up of the banked material and the linking of existing datasets is possible’, which 
might help erect another pillar supporting the Netherlands National Genomics 
Strategy.69 The survey was held among all principal investigators in the Netherlands 
in the area of general practitioner’s medicine and epidemiology, as well as the 
principal investigators in the area of asthma, Alzheimer’s disease, breast cancer, 
lymfome cancer, reumatoid artritis and multiple sclerose. The response rate was 60%. 
Asked whether they granted access to ‘their’ research data, the respondents answered 
as follows. 15% did not grant access, 9,3 % granted access on demand, without 
conditions, 1,5% made their data publicly available (anonimised) and 73,3% only 
gave access on special terms and conditions.70 Admittedly, this type of survey has 
many limitations and additional empirical data is to be gathered before any definitive 
conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, the responses clearly suggest that a large 
majority does not grant unconditional access to their research data. Their attitude is at 
odds with the Fifth Commandment, postulated in Part I. As a result, it may deter or 
delay scientific revolutions, paralyse the ‘Invisible Hand’, delay patient cure and care, 
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result in suboptimal use of ‘unique datasets’ for the Netherlands National Genomics 
Strategy and undermine two of the three European pillars for the harvesting of the 
potential of the life sciences and biotechnology.  
 
II.3  Reasons for ‘capitalist’ behaviour 
 
II.3.1. Reasons for data withholding. The respondents in the global and Netherlands 
surveys have not been asked to state the reasons for denying or imposing conditions 
on access. However, the Netherlands survey was designed so as to preclude a number 
of reasons that are typically advanced to justify the withholding of data, i.e. privacy71, 
technical inaccessibility of the data and/or its limited potential of the collection for 
‘secondary use’. Specifically, 79% of the respondents confirmed that, assuming 
compliance with privacy rules, ‘their’ database could be used for research other than 
the research for which the data had originally been collected. And 76% indicated that, 
assuming again privacy-compliance, their database was technically (in terms of hard- 
and software) accessible for additional research by others.  
 
In general, a variety of reasons could be advanced to explain why scientists depart 
from the sharing ethos: personal motives, financial interests, legal constraints, 
institutional incentives and uncertainty as to which data should be accessible.  
 
II.3.2  Personal motives, financial interests and informal networks 
 
The Nobelprize. Watson was rather blunt about his motives; honour, the desire to 
accomplish something to brag about against friends and, especially, girlfriends, the 
desire to defeat giants like Linus Pauling and, ultimately, to win the Nobelprize. As 
we have seen above, these competitive notions form part, to a certain extent, of 
Merton’s normative structure.  
 
Blood, sweat and subsidies. The American survey revealed as an important motive for 
data-withholding the time and costs involved in meeting the requests. Another major 
motive was the desire to use the data for new research.72 Having to share data may 
also lead to a drop in ‘authorships’, another yardstick for government and public 
funding bodies to assess and reward productivity. Apart from being a resource for 
new research and new publications, the data can also be a potential source for new 
patent applications and a new round of public (or private) funding, as illustrated by 
the Netherlands National Genomics Strategy. The Dutch government acknowledges 
the unique character of certain Dutch datasets and takes that into consideration when 
deciding on grant proposals. If the primary data-producers would be under an 
obligation to grant unconditional access to ‘their’ datasets, their opportunities to 
capitalize on their resource would be diluted to the extent other scientist would have a 
‘free ride’ on their original efforts.73. Such a ‘free ride’ might also prove a 
disincentive to start producing such databases in the first place.74  
 
Access by whom and for whom? Informal networks. Proponents of unconditional 
access typically assume the standard situation: a secondary researcher requests access 
to a primary researcher’s data. In complex research, however, this situation will be a 
rarity. Hilgartner and Rauf have pointed out that researchers, both data-requesters and 
data-producers, form part of research-networks.75 The decision whether or not to 
grant access is not made by a single scientist, but by multiple parties: the research 
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team, representing various departments or universities and public and private funding 
bodies76. And increasingly, as we saw above, patients have come to claim a say on 
access issues as well, patients being both data-suppliers and stakeholders. The parties 
requesting access to data could be competing research groups, complementary 
research groups, public and private funding bodies77 and, again, patient interest 
groups. Factors to consider when deciding on a request for access will include the 
likelihood of future reciprocity,78 recognition,79 the proposed use of the data,80 
potential abuse of the data, loss of control over the data for future own use81 and the 
quality of the researcher or research team making the request. Some data-collections 
have built a reputation which may suffer from publications of inferior research. And 
finally, the decision may be affected by the existence of symbiotic and informal 
networks between like-minded scientists. 
  
II.3.3  Legal constraints 
 
II. 3.3.1 Privacy. To the extent biomedical research data contains personal data, the 
access to such data is subject to an array of intersecting privacy laws. In the UK for 
example, a Wellcome Trust report has identified the following current and proposed 
legislation governing public health researchers accessing existing collections of 
research data and biological samples: 
 
• the Data Protection Act 1998; 
• the common law of confidentiality; 
• the Human Tissue Act;  
• the Human Rights Act; 
• the stance of local ethics committees; 
• the application of Section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001; 
• the requirements of clinicians’ regulatory bodies regarding patient 
confidentiality; and 
• the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 200382 . 
 
As the resulting situation is awfully complicated, only a few basics will be discussed 
here.83 Implementing the EU Data Protection Directive, the Dutch Data Protection 
Act84 provides that personal data may be processed for research purposes, provided 
that the processor has taken appropriate security measures so as to ensure that 
processing is limited to this specific purpose.85 Processing personal health data 
however, without that person’s consent, is prohibited. Yet, this prohibition does not 
apply to processing for research purposes, provided that the research serves a public 
interest, the processing is necessary for the research concerned, asking explicit 
consent is either impossible or requires a disproportionate effort and the research 
provides for guarantees so as to minimise potential harm to the data-subject’s 
privacy.86  
 
II.3.3.2 Informed consent for research. A related legal impediment that may provide a 
legitimate reason to withhold access is the requirement of informed consent. For 
example, to the extent research data contains patient-data, the Dutch Act on the 
physician patient relationship provides that a physician may only grant access to 
patient data for scientific research in the limited events set forth in the Act and 
provided that the statutory conditions be met.87 In all other events, any processing of 
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personal health data requires the patient’s prior informed consent. A controversial 
issue in this respect is whether researchers are required to obtain specific re-consent 
for each new research project. While this is the case under the current construction of 
the informed consent requirement, there is a trend towards acceptance of simplifying 
existing specific informed consent requirements for previously unanticipated research 
use, which would obviate the need for re-consent for each new research project.88 
Notably, the global survey mentioned above revealed that most respondents (81%) 
indicated that they asked their patients or research subjects for their consent to use 
their data and material not only for the initial diagnosis, treatment or research, but also 
for future, unspecified research purposes. The Dutch survey revealed that 54% of the 
respondents asked consent for a specific research question, while 34% asked consent 
for research in general.89  
 
II.3.3.3 Quality, liability and a wrongful life. Another legal constraint concerns the 
quality of biomedical data and the related potential for their producers to incur 
liabilities for the publication of inaccurate or incomplete data. For example, for a 
couple of decades now, geneticists have been collecting so-called mutations, changes 
in DNA comprising just one base-pair. A mutation can cause an inheritable disease or 
cancer. A major number of mutations has been discovered, described and included in 
the so-called ‘Locus Specific Databases’ (‘LSDB’s’). Prior to inclusion in the LSDB, 
the data have been verified by a curator. The trouble is that the data in these databases 
is not only used for fundamental research, but also for clinical applications, such as 
diagnosis. Obviously, it is vital that the mutations data are accurate and complete. In 
spite of a number of built-in safeguards and quality-controls, 100% accuracy and 
completeness can never be guaranteed. As a result, a mutation may wrongfully be 
held as harmful and thus give ground for, for example, an abortion or prophylactic 
surgery, or vice versa.90 Depending on the circumstances, the original data-producer 
may be liable for any resulting damages, which liability may even extend, as per a 
recent Dutch Supreme Court ruling, to liability for a wrongful life. To limit his 
potential exposure, a researcher or his institution, may want, in addition to a proper 
disclaimer91, to impose conditions for access to the data, or only supply the data for a 
specific purpose or only grant class access, i.e. for accredited academics only.  
 
II.3.3.4 Proprietary claims and commercialisation of research. Finally, access may be 
limited by proprietary claims, as is often, but not necessarily, the case for drug 
research sponsored by industry. Industry normally allows publication of the research 
results, subject to a right to comment and a sixty-day waiting period to allow for 
patent applications.92 However, industry is likely to make a proprietary claim to the 
underlying research data as such, if only to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a 
market authorisation for the product concerned. In addition to proprietary claims by 
industry, academia itself is also increasingly staking its own proprietary claims. 
Researchers are being pushed, if not obligated under the terms of their grant, to 
commercialise the results of their research. Part of the ‘mission’ imposed by the 
Netherlands National Genomics Strategy is to have grantees “sell genomics-
knowledge to the business community”. 93 Given the ever increasing value of 
biomedical data, this mission is likely to extend to not only the filing of patent 
applications but also the exploitation of datasets, as they are a major source of 
patentable inventions. Arguably, the exploitation of these databases requires the 
licensing of exclusive rights to the data concerned, which, in turn, is likely to 
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compromise unconditional access by other academic researchers, who are likely to be 
equally pressed to capitalise on the results of their own publicly funded research. 
  
II.3.4  Which data, actually? 
 
II. 3.4.1 Typology of data. Another reason that might explain data-withholding is the 
issue which data ought to be accessible. Proponents of unconditional access base their 
claim on the traditional model: a scientist produces ‘data’ (output), disseminates these 
data by means of a publication, which publication makes the published findings 
available for other scientists as ‘input’ for further research. In practice, however, 
things are not that simple.94 First, a lot of data cannot be used by third parties without 
a proper explanation by the original data-producer, if only an explanation of the 
inclusion criteria used to determine the research sample. Second, as part of the 
scientific process, scientists record a host of divergent data: lab notebooks, raw data, 
derived variables, preliminary analyses, draft articles, grant applications etc.95 And if 
the research involves human subjects, the Good Clinical Practice guidelines 
prescribe96 a research protocol97, an Investigator’s brochure98, source documents99, 
‘case-report forms’100 and a clinical research report.101 Should all these data be 
accessible? Or, for example, only the clinical research report? 
  
II. 3.4.2 Data-units or data-streams? A more fundamental question is whether ‘data’ 
as such actually exist. According to Hilgartner and Rauf102 there are only data-
streams, heterogeneous collections of data, assembled in various formats. They give 
protein-christallography as an example. Protein-chrystallography comprises many 
forms of data, including ‘clones’ for the production of protein samples, protein 
christallisation techniques, atomic models, algorithms to construct these models, 
atomic co-ordinates and computer generated images of molecular structures.103 What 
data streams really are about, are the complex connections between these forms, the 
so-called ‘assemblages’. A second characteristic of data-streams is the heterogeneity 
of their factual status. The meaning and usefulness of some data are beyond 
reasonable doubt, while the meaning and usefulness of other data are so uncertain that 
they are even questioned by the data-producers themselves. Many data are on a 
gliding scale somewhere in between those two extremes. Their status also changes 
during the research process. Scientists are continuously analysing and interpreting 
data and that may explain their reluctance to release them too early.104 This may 
explain, for example, Wilkins’ refusal to send his DNA photos to Pauling. In addition, 
data are constantly being processed. X-ray photos are converted into numbers, 
numbers into tables, graphics, models and images which may finally be published. 
This processing may change content, format and usefulness of the data.105  
 
In brief, data are no pre-packaged units, capable of being shared or published. On the 
contrary, there is a continuous stream, which can be split, shared and published at a 
number of points and intervals, depending on the conventions of the specific research 
discipline concerned, according to Hilgartner and Rauf.106 Their concept of data-
streams applies a fortiori to contemporary biomedical research. As we have seen in 
Part I, this research involves the correlation of millions of data-points by relating 
molecular measurements concerning thousands of genes, proteins, metabolites with all 
sorts of clinical data (such as blood pressure, cholesterol, diabetes and MRI-scans).107 
This research is not about data-streams; it is about waves of data.  
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Conclusion Part II. With the notable exceptions of the publicly available raw data 
produced by a number of recent large-scale community resource projects, such as the 
HGP, the ideal world of unconditional access is not always the real world. This may 
be due to personal interests, scientific interests, financial interests, legal constraints 
such as privacy-concerns, informed consent requirements, quality issues, potential 
exposure to liability, proprietary claims, and conceptual doubt as to what research 
data exactly are. The principled arguments pro unconditional access (Part I) and the 
personal, institutional and legal arguments contra (unconditional) access (Part II) 
provide divergent, if not mutually exclusive and potentially conflicting perspectives. 
Part III will analyse whether this Gordian knot can be cut by operation of the law, in 
particular the double-edged sword of the European database-right. This right should 
provide an answer to the question who actually owns the research data.  
 
III  The Law: who owns the research data?  
 
III.1  The European database right.  
 
III.1.1 Introduction. The question who owns the research data will be analysed on the 
basis of the EU database-right. This right was introduced in 1996 by the European 
Union and entered into force in the Netherlands in 1999. The right vests an exclusive 
right in the producer of a database to grant permission to extract and re-utilize the 
contents of the database.108 If owned by the government it could be used as an 
instrument to enforce access; if owned by a researcher it could be used as an 
instrument to legitimise and enforce data-exclusivity. This Part first examines to 
which extent the database right applies to research databases and flags a number of 
complications. It then discusses the issue of allocation: who actually owns the 
database right in a research database. 
 
III.1.2 Case study: the Netherlands Twin Registry. Due to the potentially unlimited 
diversity of biomedical research databases, any analysis of the above issues ‘in 
abstracto’ may get lost in assumptions. To move beyond assumptions and 
generalities, the application of the database-right to research data will be analysed 
using a concrete example: the Netherlands Twin Registry (“NTR”). In many ways, the 
NTR is representative for the databases that are the object of the Netherlands National 
Genomics Strategy. As part of the European GenomEUtwin program, it may also be 
representative for the databases that are part of the European biomedical research 
infrastructure. The NTR was incorporated at the Amsterdam Free University, for 
purposes of scientific research aimed at elucidating to which extent differences 
between individuals are determined by heritable and environmental factors.109 The 
NTR comprises a large number of families having twins and contains inter alia data 
on birth weight, pregnancy, physical abnormalities, health and behaviour as well as 
physiological data, as blood pressure and cholesterol level.110 The NTR also contains 
blood samples from which genetic data can be derived.  
 
III.2  The database-right and research data 
 
III.2.1 Database-right and research data. The database-right aims to protect 
collections of data which meet the statutory definition of a database. The definition 
reads as follows:  
 
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.1 No.2 (2005) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© CESAGen, Lancaster University, UK. 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2005, Vol.1, No.2, pp.1–28. 
 
_____________ 16
A compilation of works, data or other elements, systematically or 
methodically arranged and independently accessible by electronic 
means or otherwise and of which the creation, control or 
presentation of the contents demonstrates in quantitative or 
qualitative respects a substantial investment.111
 
Prima facie this right is squarely at odds with Merton’s communism and the Fifth 
Commandment of unconditional access to research data. Because of its adverse 
implications for science, the right has been criticised by many observers of scientific 
research.112 Indeed, the theoretical justification of the introduction of this novel right 
was clearly not the advancement of science. Rather, the database-right has been 
created with the explicit goal to promote the (European) database-industry. This 
triggers the question whether the database-right actually applies to scientific research 
databases. Neither the Dutch law, nor the European Directive, nor their respective 
legislative histories, however, provide for a ground to exempt research databases from 
the application of the database-right. On the contrary, the research exemption and the 
definition of research data in the preamble to the Directive113 imply that this right 
does also apply to collections of scientific research data.114 So far, the issue has not 
provoked any lawsuits before the Dutch, German or French courts. Notably, critics in 
the science community have not questioned its applicability and simply assume that it 
does apply to research databases. The communis opinio of legal commentators on the 
database-right in general is that the statutory definition of a database practically 
encompasses all types of data imaginable.115 It is to be assumed therefore, that the 
database right could extend to collections of research data.  
 
III.2.2 Independent data. The next element of the definition is that the data be 
‘independent’, i.e. they must have a meaning of their own, regardless of the rest of the 
contents of the database. Whether that is the case, will vary from database to database. 
Conceptually, it is possible to have a database of which the individual data only have 
meaning when taken together, just as the various chapters making up a novel only 
make sense when read as a whole. In fact, the very goal of any research on the data 
will be to gain insight in the relationships between the individual data. The concept of 
data-streams even suggests that independent data never have a meaning of their own. 
Rather, there are many forms of data, which are constantly processed and their 
meaning may vary from experimental (e.g. Rosy’s data) to paradigm. This conceptual 
approach however, cannot take away from the fact that usually subsets of a database 
can be independently studied for separate research questions, suggesting that the 
individual data in the database have independent significance. The NTR data, for 
example, are frequently used to create small subsets to allow more specific research. 
  
III.2.3 Systematically arranged and separately accessible. This requirement holds that 
the database must have a search function allowing for direct retrieval of specific 
data.116 It is generally held that digitally stored data will, by definition, meet this 
requirement.117 Thus, even a collection of unstructured (clinical) data could qualify, 
as long as the collection is searchable for specific items, without the user having to 
scroll over all the data.118 Obviously, the NTR satisfies this requirement and it seems 
safe to assume that most other biomedical research databases do so as well. 76% of 
the respondents in the KNAW-survey confirmed that their databases were accessible 
(qua hard- and software) for additional research by other researchers.  
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III.2.4 Substantial investment. The goal of the database-right is to promote investment 
in database-production. Only those database are eligible for protection that 
demonstrate a substantial investment. It is held that it is not necessary that the 
database has been produced for exploitation purposes. Databases produced for internal 
purposes or produced by volunteers are said to demonstrate substantial investment.119 
An investment may take the form of monetary investment, time, effort and energy, or 
‘blood, sweat and tears’. Both the Directive and Netherlands law are silent as to when 
an investment qualifies as substantial. This will require a case-by-case analysis. Given 
the amount of time and money required to build the NTR, this database most likely 
demonstrates a substantial investment. 
  
III.3  Complications of the database-right 
 
III.3.1 Complications. While many research databases will satisfy the various 
elements of the statutory definition, the application of the database-right to research 
databases nevertheless gives rise to three complicated questions. First, is a database 
eligible for protection, even if it is a mere ‘spin off’ from another investment. Second, 
does the database-right create a monopoly on ‘unique data’? Third, how does the right 
relate to the public domain? 
 
III.3.1.1 Complication 1: the ‘spin off’-theory. As we have seen, the goal of the 
database-right is to promote investment in (European) database-production. Given this 
goal, it has been argued that those databases which are not a direct product of a 
specific investment but rather a spin-off from an investment that was made in another 
activity, do not qualify for protection.120 This question was raised during the debate in 
the Dutch Parliament over the implementation of the database-right into Dutch law, 
when members of Parliament asked the following question. ‘The discovery of a new 
solar system requires a substantial investment in a telescope or a journey into space. 
Among other things, it will result in obtaining a collection of stars with names 
attached to them. Is such a collection a protected database?’121  
 
In response to this question, the Dutch Minister replied that this collection does not 
satisfy the statutory definition of a database, because the investment was not aimed at 
obtaining the list of stars but concerned research by way of a telescope or a journey 
into space.122 Commentators by and large concur, be it that some have argued that this 
could be different if observations and measurements are made for the specific purpose 
of creating a catalogue of stars.’123 While the Dutch lower courts and even the Dutch 
Supreme Court seem split on the issue, the ‘spin off-theory’ has recently been adopted 
by the European Court of Justice.124 The ECJ construed the statutory requirement of 
an investment in obtaining the contents of a database as to require an investment made 
to obtain the existing elements and to put them in a specific database. For purposes of 
assessing whether a database demonstrates a substantial investment, investments that 
were made to merely create the elements that form the contents of a database do not 
suffice.125  
 
The ECJ-cases concerned databases which had been produced by the commercial 
sports industry and subsequently used in the gambling-industry. It remains open to 
question therefore, whether the ‘spin off’-theory also applies to public investments in 
scientific research. On the one hand, no single public investment in science is, strictly 
speaking, aimed at creating a database. As we have seen in Part I, the institutional 
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goal of science is ‘the extension of certified knowledge’. The goal of the NTR, for 
example is not to create a twin registry, but to extend the knowledge concerning the 
nature and nurture of differences between individuals. As a matter of principle, given 
academic freedom, it is even questionable whether a public funding body can impose 
that its funding be applied for a specific research goal, such as building a database. 
And as a practical matter, we saw in Part I that the public funding of research in many 
cases does not include the costs of creating and maintaining accessible databases. 
 
On the other hand, as Kuhn made clear, most research methods consist to a large 
extent of collecting, verifying and presenting data, incidentally the terms used in the 
Dutch statutory definition of a database. The explicit goal of the Human Genome 
Project, for example, was to create a database containing the fully annotated sequence 
of human DNA. The effort has produced a (downloadable) public database which 
constitutes both an ‘extension of certified knowledge’ and a database for future 
research. And for contemporary data-driven biomedical research, creating databases 
is a crucial element. If we were to adopt this approach, any investment in research 
amounts to an investment to obtain existing elements and to collect these in a 
database, and thus such investment would meet the spin-off criterion as adopted by 
the ECJ.  
 
III.3.1.2 Complication 2: unique data. The application of the EU database-right is 
further compounded by the phenomenon of ‘unique data’. The preamble to the EU 
database-right Directive explicitly provides that the database-right may not give rise 
to the creation of a new right on data proper.126 A database-right is only an exclusive 
right in the database as such. It does not pre-empt anyone from collecting the same 
data to create his own database. However, this framework does not apply in the event 
the collected data are one of a kind or ‘unique’. For example, a specific twin’s weight 
or length at a specific age can be measured only once. Conceptually, then, as a 
corollary of the preamble to the Directive, the database-right should simply not apply 
to databases containing unique data. The Directive, however, does not provide for 
such a ban, but purports to offer alternative solutions to secure access to unique data.  
 
First, if unique data make up only an insubstantial part of the database, they can be 
extracted and re-utilized without the consent of the owner of the database-right.127 
Second, the Directive provides that the exercise of a database right is at all times 
subject to the competition laws. Under these laws, a data-monopolist abusing his 
monopoly can be forced to grant access to the data on the terms of a compulsory 
license. In practice, this is not a viable option for most scientists since competition 
proceedings are a costly and time-consuming affair that public funding bodies are 
unlikely to fund. Third, the database-right provides for a ‘research exemption’, which 
allows the lawful user to use the database for research purposes, without the consent 
of the owner of the database. This solution too, however, is rather limited.128 It 
requires a ‘lawful user’, i.e. a user who has legitimate access to the database, e.g. 
under the terms of a license. Also, the exemption only applies if the database has been 
made available, one way or the other, to the public. This latter requirement may be 
satisfied once a researcher has published his findings, as most journal policies demand 
that authors make the data underlying their published findings available to others for 
purposes of verification.129 The research exemption is also limited in that it is not 
compulsory; it can be excluded in the license of a lawful user. And the exemption 
only covers the use and not the re-utilisation of the database, although this restriction 
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is not necessarily an impediment to research, as research typically only requires the 
right to use the data and not the right to make the data available to the public.130 
Furthermore, the exemption limits access to the extent justified by the non–
commercial purpose, a line which, in contemporary, ‘profit driven’ academia, will be 
hard to draw. Finally, the exemption as provided in the Directive was optional. The 
review of the implementation of the Directive in the Member States revealed that 
France and Italy had not implemented the research exemption.131
 
III.3.1.3 Complication 3: public databases and the public domain. A third 
complication, at least under Dutch law, is that the database-right does not apply to 
databases which have been produced by the ‘public authority’, unless the database-
right has been reserved either by statute, regulation or decree, or in a specific case by 
means of an explicit notice attached to the database itself or an explicit reservation 
when the database was made available to the public.132 This provision is based on 
article 13 of the Directive which provides that the database-right does not prejudice 
existing rights to access public documents. The rationale behind this provision is that 
public works, produced by the public authorities should in principle be part of the 
public domain.133 ‘Public authorities’ include public institutions, to the extent they are 
operating within the scope of their public remit and/or within their public 
competences.134 Obviously, public research funding bodies will usually satisfy this 
criterion. The resulting situation is rather awkward. While these bodies are likely to 
qualify as the producers of the database (as we will discuss next), the database-right 
does not apply, except if it has been reserved. Whether it has been reserved is to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis, as the database may be funded by a variety of public 
funding bodies. The terms and conditions of the Netherlands Organisation for 
Research Funding (NWO), for example, provide that its grants may be subject to 
specific conditions concerning ownership rights in respect of the databases that are 
produced in the course of the funded research.135 In the event NWO elects not to 
reserve its database-right, the databases generated by the funded research seem to 
form part of the public domain. While that outcome may be intuitively appealing, 
whether it is desirable for scientific research-databases, is open for debate. Apart from 
privacy concerns, a number of legitimate concerns presented in Part II argue for 
placing limitations on unconditional access. It is unclear which party is in a position to 
impose such limitations if the database forms part of the public domain. 
 
III.4  Who actually owns the database-right? 
 
III.4.1 The producer: the funding body or the researcher? The database-right vests in 
the producer of the database. The producer is the person who bears the risk of the 
investment in the database. An investment may comprise a financial or a professional 
investment.136 However, for purposes of determining who bears the risk, only 
financial risks will be taken into account.137 Employees and contractors138 who do not 
bear a financial risk, cannot be the owners of the database-right.139 Departing from the 
Directive, the Dutch legislator considers it also irrelevant who took the initiative to 
create the database.140 As long as the initiative and the funding are provided by one 
and the same person or entity, this should not be a problem. However, in the case of 
publicly funded research, the initiative and the responsibility for the database will 
typically vest in the researcher, whereas the funding body bears the financial risk. In 
that event, it is unclear which person qualifies as the producer,141 although the 
financial component is probably decisive. On the one hand, this seems a desirable 
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outcome: the sword of the database-right would thus provide an instrument for public 
funding bodies to secure all scientists access to the data produced by their peers. This 
outcome would also underpin the pillars for the harvesting of European life sciences 
and biotechnology research. On the other hand, being a producer may have 
undesirable implications for a public funding body. As the owner of the database-
right, it will have to handle requests for access and impose conditions to meet the 
legitimate objections against unconditional access advanced in Part II. This will 
require expert knowledge of the area of research in question which the body may not 
have and/or a balancing of interests the body may not be capable of handling. 
 
III.4.2 Multiple funding bodies: co-producers. The previous analysis was based on the 
rather hypothetical assumption that a research database is funded by a single funding 
body. In practice, this is unlikely to be the case. The NTR, for example, is only partly 
funded out of the so-called primary funding, a lump sum amount allocated by the 
government to the Netherlands universities for further distribution among their 
departments.142 Additional funding is provided by the European Union which funds the 
GenomeEUtwin project of which NTR and a group of European and Australian twin 
registries form part.143.144 The GenomeEUtwin project, in turn, forms part of the 
international consortium ‘P3G’, which has been awarded Canadian and, recently, EU 
funding.145 In addition, the NTR forms part of the Centre for Medical Systems Biology 
(“CMSB”), a consortium of Netherlands research institutes, funded by NWO, as part of 
the National Genomics Strategy, the so-called secundary funding. And as a condition 
for this secundary funding, the amounts involved may have been ‘matched’ by the Free 
University of Amsterdam, so that the Free University could also qualify as a producer. 
The situation gets even more complicated if these investments took place successively, 
and each investment has resulted in amendments and modifications of the NTR. 
Successive investments in an existing database create new database-rights in the 
databases that have resulted from these investments.146 The answer, then, to the 
question who actually owns the database-right in the NTR is that multiple funding 
bodies are likely to qualify as ‘co-producers’, collectively owning the database,147 
assuming the bodies have reserved the database-right and absent contractual provisions 
to the contrary. 
 
Conclusion Part III. While the database-right does apply to research databases, this 
application is complicated by the ‘spin off-theory’, unique data monopolies and the 
requisite reservation by the public authorities. The right belongs to the producer, 
being the person who bears the risks of the financial investments in the database. To 
the extent biomedical databases are funded by multiple funding bodies, the respective 
producers are jointly entitled to the database-rights in the database. The European 
database-right is an inevitable but awkward fit for databases comprising scientific 
research data. Apart from the fact that its provisions do not readily apply to the 
specific contexts of this type of databases, its most striking feature is that it fails to 
acknowledge the ‘investment’ made by a researcher or his institution in the 
production of such databases. In conclusion, the European database-right does not 
seem to be the sharp sword to cut the Gordian knot in which the issue of access to 
research databases is tied up. 
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IV.  Policy: Greasing the Wheels of Research 
 
IV. 1 Policy or No Policy? If there is no reason to develop policy, then that is a good 
reason not to develop policy. Existing co-operation between academic research 
institutes and a number of widely used data-collections suggest that either data-access 
was no issue to these co-operations or that the data-producers involved were able to 
strike a deal on the terms of access. However, the principled arguments pro 
unconditional access (Part I) and the laws and practical considerations contra 
(unconditional) access (Part II) offer conflicting perspectives. The resulting situation 
is compounded by the uncertainty created by the database-right as to who holds legal 
title to the databases. This lends urgency to the formulation of at least a number of 
principles and recommendations. Therefore, this final Part will explore whether the 
two opposing concerns – unconditional access vs. legitimate restrictions – can be 
accommodated by the adoption and implementation of a general policy for access to 
biomedical data. As an additional benefit, a well designed policy could remedy the 
adverse implications of the database-rights, by allocating certain rights to the scientist 
or his institution or by other means granting appropriate credit. This could also help 
alleviate the plight of funding bodies that may be surprised to find themselves as the 
owners of the databases they have funded. The above applies in particular to large, 
data-driven research projects in biomedical research. As we saw in the Introduction, 
two pillars for the harvesting of the potential of life-sciences and biotechnology are 
access to detailed, up-to-date and available bioinformatics databases and open access 
to knowledge. The more access becomes vital for research, the better it may be to 
have a clear set of rules and principles to guide access decisions. A clear policy could 
help avoid costly and time-consuming negotiations and prevent stalemates, in an era 
where speed matters and patients can’t wait. This way an access policy could actually 
grease the wheels of research. A final reason for adopting a policy is the fact that 
funding agencies in other countries have recently established data-sharing policies, 
which may extend to forms of multinational research. Most notably, the US NIH 
adopted in 2003 its Data-Sharing policy, which requires grant applicants to include a 
plan for sharing final research data.148  
 
IV.2 Accessibility: compulsory or voluntary? Any policy is eventually dependent on 
political and scientific choices. The most fundamental choice to be made is whether 
the leading principle should be that access should be always be voluntary or that 
access should be compulsory, subject to a predefined set of conditions. The 
conclusions concerning the database-right indicate that the bodies funding the 
research own the resulting data and thus they are the entities that ultimately make this 
decision.  
 
IV.3 General requirements. A policy should in any event meet the following 
requirements: 
 
• Be transparent, flexible and doing justice to the context of specific research, 
the status of the (unique) data involved and the legitimate interests of both 
researchers and patients; 
• Be compliant with applicable legislation, in particular the privacy rules; 
• Be in line with data-sharing policies of national and international journals; 
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• Be in line with grant-policies; references to the database in publications should 
be a factor to consider in grant applications and a factor in the performance 
assessment of the institutions concerned; 
• Be enforceable; including extra grants to make and maintain data available; 
 
IV.4 Policy issues. The issues set forth below reflect and seek to accommodate the 
concerns for and against accessibility of research data set forth in Part I and Part II. 
Some issues draw on the issues listed in the NIH Data Sharing Policy. A policy 
should in any event address the following issues: 
 
• Definition of the data that should be made accessible, taking into account the 
concept of data-streams, in particular as regards the type and the status of 
(unique) data;  
• Quality control and peer review; 
• The right of the maker of the database to be the first to publish; the moment 
third parties should get access; 
• Mode of accessibility, which may be dependent on the type of data, number of 
expected requests, sensibility of data etc. The NIH-data sharing policy, for 




o Any combination of the above 
• Mode of recognition by the requesting party in publications and grant 
applications, based on the database;   
• The grounds on which access may be denied, deferred or subjected to a 
predefined set of conditions, such as the goal and the quality of the research 
proposal, and/or the quality of the requesting researcher,149 approval by 
medical-ethics committee, reasonable doubt as to status of the data; 
• The conditions to which access may/may not be subjected; 
• Reimbursement of costs; 
• Transfer of data to third parties; 
• Allocation of IP rights to the results of the research;  
• Liabilities and disclaimers; 




Access to detailed, up-to-date and available bioinformatics databases is identified by 
the European Commission as a pillar for the harvesting of the potential of life-
sciences and biotechnology. Unconditional access to research data, however, is at 
odds with the primary interest of every scientist to be the first to make a discovery. 
This classical dilemma forces us to consider the principle, the practice and the law 
regarding access for academic researchers to unpublished research data. As to 
principle, it is argued that, in addition to the Communism postulated in Merton’s Four 
Commandments for the conduct of science, scientific revolutions, the ‘Invisible Hand 
of Research’, public funding, the data-driven nature of biomedical research and the 
interests of patients and the public at large, provide powerful arguments to postulate a 
Fifth Commandment: unconditional access to unpublished research data. However, in 
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practice, access to research data is governed by Capitalism, due to the egos of 
scientists, the financial interests of their institutions, public privacy-concerns, 
proprietary claims and conceptual doubt as to what data exactly are. The Law, in the 
form of the European database-right, potentially addresses the conflicting perspectives 
on access to data offered by communism and capitalism. However, the European 
database-right is an awkward fit for databases comprising scientific research data and 
does not provide a straight answer to the question who owns the database. It thus fails 
to provide a sharp sword to cut the Gordian knot of principled arguments pro 
unconditional access and the laws and practical objections contra (unconditional) 
access. As a matter of Policy, then, at least a number of principles and 
recommendations should be formulated, if only to create legal certainty. In addition 
this policy should seek to remedy the failure of the Law to acknowledge the 
‘investment’ made by a researcher or his institution in the production of databases, 
either by allocating certain rights to the scientist or his institution or by other means 
granting appropriate credit. That could also help alleviate the plight of funding bodies 
that may be surprised to find themselves as the joint legal owners of the databases 




The Bermuda Principles. Apart from guidance provided by existing policies regarding 
specific issues and existing repositories (e.g. pathology archives), guidance may be 
found in examples and experiences, such as the NIH Data-Sharing policy. A major 
source of inspiration ought to be, mutatis mutandis, the Bermuda principles adopted 
by the Human Genome Project (HGP). Fifty years after the discovery of the molecular 
structure of DNA, the HGP completed the assembly of the human DNA sequence. 
After it had abandoned, at the urge of Watson, its initial drive to patent the cDNA 
sequences it was producing, the HGP adopted the Bermuda principles to secure rapid 
and unconditional access to the sequence data. Under these principles all participating 
scientists were required to release their unpublished DNA-sequence data in public 
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